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1 Introduction 
Zellner (1996) proposed a novel methodology for estimating structural pa-
rameters and predicting future observables based on 2 moments of a subjec-
tive distribution and the application of the Maximum Entropy principle-all 
in the absence of an explicit statistical model or likelihood function for the 
data. He terms his procedure the Bayesian Method of Moments (BMOM]. 
It is our view that there are inconsistencies in his approach with Bayesian 
(conditional) probability and that the procedure is misnamed as Bayesian. 
A more appropriate designation might be the Maximum Entropy Method of 
Moments (MEMOM]. We give the reasons for our view for only the simplest 
case he considers. Other cases suffer from the same predicament, however. 
2 BMOM 
For the simplest BMOM case, we start with a structural model: 
Yi = 0 + ui ( i = 1, . . . , n) (1) 
where only the Yi are observed. Let yCn) denote these observations. Both 0 
and the ui are unknown and no statistical model, that is, no likelihood func-
tion is specified for them apart from what equation (1) entails is impossible. 
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We identify two steps in Zellner's derivation of BMOM probabilities. The 
first step is taken with Assumptions I and II, which fix two moments of the 
"posterior" distribution of the error term ii as a function of the observed 
sample yCn) and a new parameter u2 • This first step induces "posterior" first 
moments on each of the two parameters (0, u2) and a conditional second 
moment on 0, given u2 • Let Yn = n-1 Li=t Yi ands;= (n - 1)-1 Ef=1(Yi -
Yn)2 • From Assumption I we have that E[Oly(n)] = Yn and from Assumption II 
that E(u2 ly(n)] = s! and then that Var[Ola2 , y(n)] = u2 /n. Zellner also applies 
these two moment assumptions to the predictive probability P(Yn+t IY(n)), so 
that E(Yn+l la2 , y(n)] = Yn and Var[Yn+l la2 , y(n)] = a 2 ( n + I)/ n. 
The second step for arriving at BMOM probability is to use the MAXENT 
principle in order to fix exact distributions with these moments as constraints. 
He thus obtains the following: 
and 
where 
p(Blo-2, y(nl) = J n e-~(9-Y.)' 
21ra2 
1 0'2 
p(a21Y(n)) = -e --;r 
s2 
n 
sJ=(n;l)s!. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
As a first alert that this inference is suspicious, we note that the BMOM 
distribution of a2 does not converge to a2 as n increases. That is, let Zn = 
a2/s;. Then the BMOM density satisfies P(ZnlY(n)) = e-zn for all n. To put 
this in perspective, note that E[a2 ly(n)] = s!. But this BMOM distribution 
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of a2 has its median at (ln2) s; ~ .7s;, which is bounded away from its mean 
s;, and its quartiles are approximately .3s; and 1.4s;. We think that this 
is a relatively minor anomaly which we bracket here in order to discuss two 
non-Bayesian aspects of BMOM inferences. 
3 Nonexistence of a Global Bayesian Model 
for BMOM 
Of course, the BMOM joint posterior density for the two parameters is just 
the product 
(5) 
Next, consider the Bayesian condition: 
Equations (4) and (5) identify two of the three terms in (6) with only the 
likelihood P(Yn+110, a2 , y<n>) not yet explicitly given. However, the integral 
equation (6) has a unique solution: 
2 ( ) 1 1 (0 - )2 P(Yn+110,a ,Y n) = _.,,,,==e-~ -Yn+i 
J21ra2 • 
(7) 
Let us inquire, first, about existence of a global Bayesian model for BMOM 
inference by working backwards from the joint BMOM posterior (5). That 
is, by Bayes, there must exist some likelihood L(y<n>10, a2 ) and prior p(0, a2 ) 
where: 
(8) 
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though these may not be unique. Assume that we are willing to make the 
predictive Assumptions I and II for all n. Then, as the solution (7) is unique 
for all n > 1, we extract a joint likelihood which is, in fact, the i.i.d. N(0,a2 ) 
statistical model for the Yi= 
L(y(n)IO, o-2) = ii 1 2 e-~(8-y;)• 
i=l~ 
(9) 
However, if we use the BMOM posterior (5) and induced likelihood (9) to 
identify the prior p(0, a2 ) in (8), we discover that, unfortunately, the ratio 
2 p(0, a21y(n)) 
p(0, (1 ) ex L(y(n)l0, a2 (10) 
depends on the sample statistics Yn and s! and therefore changes for each 
n, which means that it is not a prior in the Bayesian sense. Hence, either 
there is no global Bayesian model for BMOM inference, or else the predictive 
Assumptions I and II are allowed only for certain samples. And just which 
value of n may these be? 
4 Nonexistence of a Local Bayesian Model 
for BMOM 
The Bayesian approach yields coherent solutions for updating according to 
the laws of conditional probability. Thus, to have even a local Bayes model, 
BMOM must satisfy 
(O 2 1 (n+l)) _ P(Yn+1IY(n>,0,a
2)p(0,a2ly(n)) 
p '(1 Y - P(Yn+ily(n)) · (11) 
In the right-hand side of (11), the two terms in the numerator are, respec-
tively, (7) and (5), and the denominator is (3). In solving the right-hand side 
4 
of (11) we do not obtain the BMOM posterior corresponding to (5) evaluated 
at y(n+l). That is, the right-hand side of (11) does not yield: 
n±1(o - )2 1 --:F-e-~ -Yn+1 X --e •n+l 2 , 
8 n+l 
(12) 
which is the BMOM solution to p(O, a 2 ly(n+l)) under the very same assump-
tions that lead to the three terms that constitute the right-hand side of (II). 
Instead, the right-hand side of (11) yields: 
_.!!±l(O-y )2 1 
e ~ n+l X ---e 
asnfo (13) 
Evidently, the conflict between BMOM's rule and Bayesian updating is over 
the (marginal) posterior for the parameter a2 • In short, either there is no 
local Bayes model of BMOM inference, or else the predictive Assumptions I 
and II cannot be made for even a future sample of size 1. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
The reader may better understand the non-Bayesian aspects of BMOM prob-
ability by remembering the two steps that Zellner takes in deriving it. The 
first step is taken with Assumptions I and II, which fix moments of the 
posterior (0, a 2) parameter distribution, and of the predictive distribution 
for Yn+I, all as a function of the observed sample y(n). Specifically, from 
Assumption I we have that E[0ly(n)] = Yn and from Assumption II that 
E[a2 ly(n)] = s! and then that Var[0la2 , y(n)] = a2 /n. Applied to the predic-
tive probability P(Yn+1 lyCn>], the two assumptions yield E[Yn+1 la2 , y<n>] = Yn 
and Var[Yn+ila2 , y<n>] = a2(n + 1)/n. Recall, also, that the second step in 
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arriving at BMOM probability is to use the MAXENT principle in order to 
fix exact distributions with these moments as constraints. 
The first step, by itself, is not in conflict with Bayesian theory, as the fol-
lowing analysis shows. Specifically, for coherence of conditional expectations 
(in fact, as a consequence of the law of total probability), we require that for 
each random variable X, 
(14) 
Now from Assumption I applied to the posterior at the two sample sizes, 
namely, 
(15) 
we get 
(16) 
just as is needed for consistency with the first predictive moments about 
Yn+i· 
The consequences of the two versions of Assumptions II are straightfor-
ward too. Assume 
(17) 
Now, expanding s!+ 1, write 
2 _ 2 (n -1) 1 [ _ 12 Sn+l - Sn -n- + n + l Yn+l - Yn · (18) 
Then, as E[s!+i jy(n)] must equals! by the "law," we have the simple result 
2 _ _ n_E[( _ - )21 (n)] 8n - n + l Yn+l Yn Y · (19) 
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From before we have that E[Yn+ilY(n)] = Yn· Thus, 
But 
2 - n V: [ I (n)] Sn - --1 ar Yn+l Y • 
n+ 
() n + l Var[Yn+1 IY n ] = --s! 
n 
just as is needed for coherence. 
(20) 
(21) 
Thus, Zellner's use of sample moments to fix BMOM moments for the 
parameters is coherent. However, in light of the results about global and 
local non-Bayesian aspects of BMOM probability, we conclude that here it is 
the applications of the MAXENT principle which are the source of conflict 
between BMOM's and Bayes' rule for updating. 
References 
1. Zellner, A. (1996). Bayesian method of moments (BMOM) analysis of 
mean and regression models. Modelling and Prediction, ed. J.C. Lee et 
al. Springer Verlag, New York, 61-74. 
7 
